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The aim of this paper is to analyze the macroeconomics consequences of Basel III, which will 
be completely implemented in 2019. 
Starting with an analysis of the guidelines of Basel I and Basel II and briefly discussing about 
the recent Financial Crisis, I focus my attention on Basel III, trying to analyze its impacts. 
If the new Regulatory would impact the stability of the financial and bank system, at the same 
time it can have some negative impacts on the real economy, especially in regards to the 
operability of the banks. 
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Banking crises, with their associated economic losses, have been much more frequent than we 
would like. To increase financial stability, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has 
established stronger capital and liquidity requirements. 
The purpose of this paper is to assess the L-T economic impact of the Basel III requirements, 
once banks have completed the transition to the new requirements. Specifically, the paper 
wants to analyses and have an answer to the following key questions. 
Why Basel III? What is the impact of the Regulation on the economy? 
To assess the impact of the Framework on the L-T steady-state level of output, I have mainly 
relied on some macroeconomic models – DSGE and VECM, using quarterly data over the 
period 1997 – 2010 and considering two sets of policy scenarios (for capital and for liquidity). 
To estimate the steady-state economic cost, the following were taken into consideration: the 
real GDP and real bank lending to private sector, the real S-T interest rate, the lending spread, 
the average ROE of the considered banks, the average TCE/RWA ratio and NSFR, the Real 
Estate Price Inflation ratio and the ratio of Current Account balance to nominal GDP. 
The benefit is represented by the reduction of the probability of a banking crisis and the 
associated GDP loss, in addition to the improvement of improving also the stability of the 
banking sector and of its ability to absorb shocks. The economic costs are represented mainly 
by the higher lending rates. The “results” of an increase in the capital and liquidity 
requirement are the welfare loss, measured in terms of consumption, and a loss in steady-state 
output. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Chapter 1 reviews the existing Regulations (Basel I 
and Basel II); Chapter 2 is an excursus of the Financial Crisis 2007/2008; Chapter 3 goes 
through Basel III, describing its main pillars; Chapter 4 and 5 present respectively the cost-




1. Basel I and Basel II Regulations 
“The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) is the primary global standard-setter 
for the prudential regulation of banks and provides a forum for cooperation on banking 
supervisory matters. Its aim is to strengthen the regulation, supervision and practices of banks 
worldwide with the purpose of enhancing financial stability.” (Bank for International 
Settlements, 2016). 
The BCBS was established by the central bank governors of the G-101 in 1975 and, even 
though they are two distinct entities, its Secretariat is located at the BIS in Basel, Switzerland. 
 
1.1 Basel I 
The Basel I Accord was the result of several discussions by central bankers from around the 
world, which consisted of a set of minimum capital requirements for banks in 1988. It was 
primarily focused on Credit Risk and Risk-Weighted Assets (RWA). 
In order to offset risk, international banks were required to hold capital (classified as Tier 1, 
Tier 2 and Tier 3 to clarify its strength) equal to 8% of their RWA. 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙	𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙	𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 = 	




The aims of Basel I were to strengthen the stability of the banking system and to define a 
uniform framework applicable in all the countries adhered. 
The key instrument was represented by the banks’ minimum capital requirement, set by 
considering the organization’s credit risk (counterparty risk); each country had also the 
possibility to consider other risks, such as the interest rate risk and the one related to 
investments in securities, setting limits even higher. 
																																																						
1 The G-10 refers to the group of countries that agreed to participate in the General Arrangements to Borrow. It 
is composed by Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland (from 




As shown in the Figure 1, banks’ assets are placed into five categories based on the level of 
risk and on the nature of the debtor, with risk weights of 0%, 10%, 20%, 50% and 100%. 
The 0% risk category is represented by cash, central bank and government debt and 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) government debt. 
The 20% category includes development bank debt, OECD bank debt, OECD securities firm 
debt, non-OECD bank debt (maturity < 1 year), non-OECD public sector debt and cash. 
The 50% category is composed by residential mortgages. 
The 100% category includes by private sector debt, non-OECD bank debt (maturity > 1 year), 
real estate, plant and equipment and capital instruments issued at other banks. 
Depending on the debtor, public sector debt can be placed in 0%, 10%, 20% or 50% category. 
 
1.2 Basel II 
The Basel II Accord was initially published in 2004. Basel II, issued by the BCBS, expanded 
the rules for minimum capital requirements in an attempt to ensure that the capital allocation 
was more risk2 sensitive, to intensify the disclosure requirements and to reduce the regulatory 
arbitrage. It focuses on three main areas, or rather three pillars: 
1. Minimum Capital Requirements; 
2. Supervisory Review Process; 
3. Market Discipline. 
Unlike Basel I, in order to establish regulatory capital ratios, Basel II incorporates credit risk 
of assets held by financial institutions, making the risk-assessment more precise and sensitive. 
1.2.1 Minimum Capital Requirements 
The first pillar focuses on with the regulatory capital calculated for the following three major 
components of risk: credit risk, operational risk and market risk. 
																																																						




• The credit risk can be calculated using a series of approaches: the Standardized 
Approach (directed to “small banks”), the Foundation and Advanced Internal Rating-
Based (IRB) Approaches (designed to “large banks”) and the General IB2 Restriction. 
• For operational risk, there are three different approaches: Basic Indicator Approach 
(BIA), Standardized Approach (TSA) and Internal Measurement Approach. 
• For market risk the main approach is Value at Risk (VaR). 
Basel II confirms and does not alter in any way the Total Capital Ratio of 8% minimum, but 
refines the RWA (calculated as the sum of assets multiplied by their risk weights) and divides 
the regulatory capital of a bank into 3 tiers, with the effect that the higher the tier, the less 
subordinated securities a bank can include in it. 
RWA is proposed to penalize banks for holding risky assets; it increases RWA and lowers 
capital ratios. The riskier the asset, the higher its weight. 
Tier 1 capital is the core measure of a bank's financial strength; it includes common stocks, 
disclosed reserves (or retained earnings) and non-redeemable non-cumulative preferred 
stocks. Tier 1 capital should be ≥ 4% of RWA. 
Tier 2 capital represents "supplementary capital" such as undisclosed reserves, revaluation 
reserves, general loan-loss reserves3, subordinated debt and hybrid (debt/equity) instruments. 
Tier 2 is limited to 100% of Tier 1 capital. 
Tier 3 consists of Tier 2 plus short-term subordinated loans. 
Larger banks are also able to plan and implement an internal rating methodology, according 
to which the minimum capital is calculated based on four elements: Probability of Defaults, 
Loss Given Default, Exposure at Default and Maturity. 
																																																						
3 General loan-loss reserves are subject to a limit of 1.25% of RWA to the extent a bank uses the standardized 




1.2.2 Supervisory Review Process 
The Supervisory Review Process, based on the below four principles presented below, 
provides the framework for national regulators to deal with systemic, strategic, reputational, 
liquidity and legal risks: 
1. Banks should have a designated process for assessing their overall capital adequacy in 
relation to their risk profile and to a strategy for maintaining their capital levels. 
2. Supervisors should review and evaluate banks’ internal capital adequacy assessments 
and strategies and take appropriate action if the results are not satisfying. 
3. Supervisors should expect banks to operate above the minimum regulatory capital 
ratios and should require banks to hold capital more than the minimum. 
4. Supervisors should intervene at an early stage to prevent capital from falling below the 
minimum levels and should require rapid action if capital is not maintained / restored. 
1.2.3 Market Discipline 
The third pillar has the objective to further attune and improve enhance the minimum capital 
requirements and supervisory review process by developing a set of requirements for banks' 
risk exposures, risk assessment processes and capital adequacy. 
2. The Financial Crisis of 2007/2008 
The Financial Crisis of 2007/2008 showed that the bank capital was, in general, too low. 
Empirical evidence and academic studies established that in order to prevent similar shocks, 
the bank capital needed to be higher. The Crisis can be analyzed considering two main 





2.1 Subprime mortgages 
In the years before the crisis there was a high flood of mortgage lending in the United States; 
loans were granted to subprime borrowers with weak credit histories who, in most of the 
cases, were not able to repay them. Putting large numbers of them together in pools, financial 
engineers transformed them into “supposedly low-risk securities”; the pooled mortgages were 
used to back securities known as collateralised debt obligations (CDOs). 
In a world of low interest rates, CDOs were appealing because they appeared to be relatively 
safe with high returns. 
 
When America’s housing market turned, pooling and other financial engineering did not 
protect investors and the value of mortgage-backed securities dropped. 
Trust began to dissolve in 2007. The collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 was the 
cause of the almost-collapse of the world’s financial system. 
 
2.2 Shadow Banking Phenomenon 
When America’s housing market turned in 2007/08, a chain reaction exposed fragilities in the 
financial system through the so-called Shadow Banking Phenomenon. It describes risky off-
balance-sheet vehicles to sell loans repackaged as bonds. 
Shadow banks operate by raising the short-term funds to buy assets with longer-term 
maturities. Problems arose when investors became dubious in regard to the value of those 
assets and many of them decided to withdraw their funds at once; to repay those investors, 
shadow banks had to sell assets. The result of these “fire sales” was the reduction of the value 





To conclude, shadow banks were characterized by a lack of information and transparency 
about the value of the assets, shadow governance and ownership structures, little regulatory 
control and a lack of access to liquidity support to prevent fire sales. 
3. Basel III 
Even before Lehman Brothers collapse in September 2008, the need for a strengthening of the 
framework was apparent. The weaknesses in the banking sector were transmitted to the whole 
of the financial system and subsequently to the real economy, with a massive contraction of 
liquidity and credit availability. 
The final text of Basel III was proposed for the first time in 2010 and it will be completely 
implemented in 2019. Please see the Figure 2 in Appendix for the roadmap. The aim of Basel 
III is mainly to strengthen the banking system and the transparency and to thus improve risk 
management, governance and the ability to absorb shocks. The Regulatory introduced some 
micro-prudential and macro-prudential reforms: 
• Bank-level, or micro-prudential, regulations to help raise the resilience of banks to 
periods of stress; 
• Macro-prudential regulations to reduce the risk of system wide shocks, promoting the 
accumulation of capital buffers in good times to be drawn down in periods of stress. 
The channels through which the new rules enacted by the BCBS – the so-called Basel III 
Standards – would impact the real economy are the Capital and Leverage ratios, the Liquidity 
Coverage Ratio (LCR) and the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR). 
 
3.1 Capital Rules 
It is important to have the banks’ risk exposures are financed by a high-quality capital base. 




sector and to introduce more precautions against model risk and measurement error. 
According to the quantitative impact study conducted by the Basel Committee, on average the 
newly-defined capital ratio (Common Equity Tier 1 ratio) of large banks decreases from 
11.1% to 5.7%, due to the change of definition of capital and the changes in RWAs. 
3.1.1 Definition of Capital 
Total regulatory capital consists of the sum of Tier 1 (going-concern capital) - Common 
Equity Tier 1 and Additional Tier 1 – and Tier 2 (gone-concern capital), subject to the 
restrictions presented in Figure 3 of the Appendix. 
3.1.1.1 Common Equity Tier 1 and Additional Tier 1 capital 
Common Equity Tier 14 (CET1) capital consists of the sum of the following elements: 
• Common shares issued by the bank; 
• Stock surplus (share premium); 
• Retained earnings (including interim profit or loss); 
• Accumulated other comprehensive income (including interim profit or loss) and other 
disclosed reserves; 
• Minority interests; 
• Regulatory adjustments5 applied in the calculation of CET1. 
Additional Tier 1 capital consists of the sum of the following elements: 
• Instruments issued by the bank (not included in CET1); 
• Stock surplus (share premium); 
• Minority interests that are not included in CET1; 
• Regulatory adjustments applied in the calculation of Additional Tier 1 Capital. 
																																																						
4 Dividends are removed in accordance with applicable accounting standards. 
5 These adjustments include goodwill and other intangibles, deferred tax assets, cash flow hedge reserve, gain on 





3.1.1.2 Tier 2 capital 
Tier 2 capital consists of the sum of the following elements: 
• Instruments issued by the bank (and are not included in Tier 1 capital); 
• Stock surplus (share premium); 
• Minority interest that are not included in Tier 1 capital; 
• Certain loan loss provisions; 
• Regulatory adjustments applied in the calculation of Tier 2 Capital. 
3.1.1.3 Transitional Arrangements 
The transitional arrangements aim at ensuring that the banks are able to meet the higher 
capital standards still supporting lending to the economy. These arrangements include: 
• Member countries had to translate the rules into national laws before 1 January 2013. 
Furthermore, banks have been required to meet the following minimum requirements: 
o 3.5% CET1/RWAs; 
o 4.5% Tier 1 capital/RWAs; 
o 8.0% total capital/RWAs. 
• The min CET1 and Tier 1 requirements have been phased in between Jan. 2013 and 
Jan. 2015; the regulatory adjustments will be deducted from CET1 by Jan. 2018. 
• From 1 January 2013, the eligible capital issued out of subsidiaries and held by third 
parties should also be phased in. In case it is not eligible, 20% of this amount should 
be excluded from the relevant component of capital on January 2014, 40% on January 
2015, 60% on January 2016, 80% on January 2017, and reach 100% on January 2018. 




3.1.2 Risk Coverage 
To better address counterparty credit risk, credit valuation adjustments and wrong-way risk, 
banks use a series of revised metrics (such as the Effective EPE6 and the CVA). They are 
obliged to use current market data and a stress calibration and the greater of the portfolio-
level capital charge based on Effective EPE. 
In addition, a bank must cover the risk of mark-to-market losses (credit value adjustments, 
CVA) on the expected counterparty risk. 













• LGDMkt is the loss given default of the counterparty; 
• The first factor represents an estimate of the risk neutral probability of default 
occurring between ti-1 and ti; 
• si is the credit spread of the counterparty in ti. It must be used if the counterparty CDS 
spread is available; in the opposite case, it should be used a proxy; 
• EEi is the expected exposure to the counterparty at revaluation time ti; 
• Di is the default risk-free discount factor at time ti, where D0 = 1. 
3.1.3 Capital Conservation Buffer 
The capital conservation buffer, fully effective in 2019, aims to ensure that banks accumulate 
capital buffers outside periods of stress, above the regulatory minimum, to be able to drawn 
down in case losses are incurred. When buffers have been drawn down, banks should rebuild 
them raising new capital from the private sector or reducing distributions of earnings. 
																																																						
6 The Effective EPE is the weighted average over time of the expected exposure; the weights are the proportion 











The Figure 4 in Appendix shows all the details regarding the minimum capital conservation 
ratios a bank must meet. 
3.1.4 Leverage Ratio 
The Committee agreed to introduce a non-risk based leverage ratio. Based on the capital and 
total exposure, the basis of calculation is the average of the monthly leverage ratio over the 
quarter. 
Items completely deducted from capital do not contribute to leverage and should therefore be 
also deducted also from the measure of exposure. Derivatives create two types of exposure: 
one reflecting the fair value of the contract and a notional one that represents the underlying 
interest of the contract. 
The transition period for the leverage ratio started on 2011; it includes a monitoring period 
(from January 2011) and a run period (from January 2013 to January 2017). Based on the 
results of the run period, any adjustments will be carried out in the first half of 2017. 
 
3.2 Liquidity Coverage Ratio 
The LCR promotes the short-term elasticity of a bank's liquidity risk profile, ensuring that a 
bank has an adequate stock of high-quality liquid assets (HQLA), which can be easily 
converted into cash. During a period of stress, banks would be expected to use their pool of 
liquid assets, even if it would cause a temporary fall below the threshold. 
To ensure that the LCR can be introduced without disruption to the banking systems or the 
economic activity, it follows a gradual approach: 60% on 2015, 70% on 2016, 80% on 2017, 










HQLA are comprised of Level 1 (cash, central bank reserves and marketable securities 
backed by sovereigns and central banks) and Level 2 (2A: some government securities, 
covered bonds and corporate debt securities and 2B: lower rated corporate bonds and 
residential mortgage backed securities) assets. Level 1 assets are the highest quality and very 
liquid, and there is no limit on the quantity a bank can hold to meet the LCR; level 2 assets 
may not in aggregate account for more than 40% of a bank’s HQLA. 
 
3.3 Net Stable Funding Ratio 
The NSFR, that will become a minimum standard by January 2018, requires banks to keep a 
stable funding profile in regard to their assets and off-balance sheet activities, in an attempt at 
reducing the likelihood that breaks to a regular source of funding will consume its liquidity 
position, thus increasing the risk of failure and potentially leading to systemic stress. 
The NSFR can be defined as the amount of Available Stable Funding (ASF)9 relative to the 





7 HQLA are characterized by quality, low risk, ease and certainty of valuation, low correlation with risky assets 
and should be listed on a developed, recognised, active and sizable market. 
8 It is defined as total expected cash outflows, minus total expected cash inflows, in the specified stress scenario 
for the subsequent 30 calendar days. Total cash inflows are subject to an aggregate cap of 75% of total expected 
cash outflows, always ensuring a minimum level of HQLA holdings. 
9 Portion of capital and liabilities expected to be reliable over the time horizon considered by the NSFR, which 
extends to one year. 
10 Function of the liquidity characteristics and residual maturities of the various assets held by that institution as 




The amount of ASF is measured based on the stability of an institution’s funding sources. It is 
calculated by first assigning the carrying value of an institution’s capital and liabilities to one 
of the categories as presented in Figure 5 in Appendix and then multiplying the total amount 
by an ASF factor; the total ASF is the sum of the weighted amounts. 
The amount of RSF is measured based on the liquidity risk profile of an institution’s assets 
and off-balance sheet exposures. It is calculated by first assigning the carrying value of an 
institution’s assets to one of the categories listed in the Figure 6 in Appendix, based on their 
residual maturity or liquidity value, and then multiplying the total amount by its RSF factor; 
the RSF is the sum of the weighted amounts added to the amount of off-balance sheets 
activity multiplied by its RSF factor. 
4. A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Basel III: Benefits and Costs 
Basel III will strengthen banking systems and stabilize financial markets, but it will also have 
some negative impacts. Even if higher bank capital requirements have several benefits from a 
financial stability perspective, they can also be the cause of a series of costs falling on banks 
and society: increasing banks’ funding costs, customers’ borrowing costs rise and investments 
and stocks of capital fall, thereby reducing the long-term level of GDP. 
Subsequently, tighter liquidity standards will lead to a reduction of banks’ profitability, which 
they will partly compensate by increasing the interest rate on loans and/or decreasing the 
remuneration on deposits. 
For the capital base, since Tangible Common Equity (TCE) is the highest quality component 











Keeping all other variables equal, an increase of liquid assets leads to a decline of RWAs and 
an increase of the ratio, helping banks to meet the tighter capital requirements and a higher 
liquidity ratio. 
 
Quarterly data11 over the period 1997:Q1 to 2010:Q2 were taken into consideration the 
present study. To estimate the steady-state economic cost, the following were considered: the 
real GDP and real bank lending (L) to private sector, the real short term interest rate (i - p) (as 
given by the 3-month interbank rate - CPI inflation), the lending spread (r - i) (as given by the 
3-month clearing banks’ lending rate - the 3-month interbank rate), the average ROE of the 
considered banks12, the average TCE/RWA ratio, the average NSFR, the Real Estate Price 
Inflation ratio (RPI)13 and the ratio of Current Account balance to nominal GDP (CA)14. 
By checking EU banks’ historical balance sheets and income statements, an approximated 






𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡mKn + 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠mKn + 85%𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝐷𝑒𝑝pKn + 70%𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝐷𝑒𝑝pKn
5%𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑡𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡	 + 50%𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠pKn + 85%𝑅𝑒𝑡𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠pKn + 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
 
The denominator reflects the RSF, with a factor applied based on their expected liquidation 
value under stressed circumstances.15. Since the portfolio structure of bank’s asset holdings is 
unknown, I applied a 50% discount factor to all less than 1 year Debt Securities. 
 
																																																						
11 The bank data were collected from Bankscope and banks’ annual reports. The macroeconomic data were 
collected from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) database. 
12 Barclays Bank, HSBC Bank, Lloyds Bank, Royal Bank of Scotland, Santander, Standard Chartered Bank. 
13 It is a great source for estimation predictive power; a higher RPI would increase the probability of crisis. 
14 Historically, a banking crisis usually coincides with a currency crisis.	
15 Cash, securities with maturity < 1 year to maturity and interbank loans do not have to be funded and have a 
factor of 0%. Government debt is considered very liquid and is funded at 5% of face value. Corporate loans and 
retail loans that mature within 1 year are funded 50% and 85%, respectively, assuming they are not rolled over 




4.1 Economic Benefits 
The Basel III reforms are expected to enhance and increase financial stability by 
strengthening the quality of banks’ capital and funding structures (increasing the TCE/RWA 
ratio), with liquidity having an important role in prevent crises and economic downturns. 
Higher capital requirements can promote bank efficiency, through cost reductions or 
discouraging banks from seizing excessive market share. The capital can be seen as a lifeline: 
it absorbs losses and reduces the probability of a failure. 
 
Averaging across countries16, historically banking crises occur every 20-25 years; according 
to Stefan Walter, “the annual probability of a crisis is 4-5% in both industrial and emerging 
markets countries”. Figure 7 shows an overview of the banking crises in BCBS member 
countries since 1985. 
In a banking crisis, two types of GDP loss might occur: a temporary one, since it may regain 
its pre-crisis level and a permanent one, because of a permanently lower GDP growth trend. 
Figure 8 shows some example of the evolution of the GDP per capita before and after each 
banking crisis. 
The crisis period can be expressed as the time from the cyclical peak to the time that the GDP 
growth rate recovers to its pre-crisis level. 
 
The benefit of the new requirements is measured as the reduction in the probability of a crisis 
multiplied by the expected loss17 arising from a financial crisis: 
𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡 = ∆𝑃𝑟 ∗ 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑	𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠	𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚	𝑎	𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙	𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 
𝑃𝑟= = Φ(𝛼I TCE 𝑅𝑊𝐴= ∗ 𝑁𝑆𝐹𝑅= + 𝛽I𝑍I=) 
																																																						
16 The countries took into consideration are: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, 
the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. 








where Zt represents a vector of macroeconomic variables (including RPIt and CAt), d the 
permanent loss and a the discount factor. 
 
The average historical TCE/RWA (or NSFR) of total capital and reserves to total assets for 
the 14 largest OECD countries from 1980 to 2008 is 6% (or 0.95). 
Holding other factors constant, a 1% (12%) increase in the TCE/RWA ratio reduces the 
probability of a crisis by around 3.211% (5%). If the NSFR ratio remains at 1, the reduction 
in the probability of a crisis will be 2.036%. Please refer to Figure 9 for more details. 
To summarise, we can state that an increase in the capital and liquidity levels leads to a 
reduction in the probability of crises, as well as the better the system is capitalized, the more 
decline the incremental benefits of the requirements. Furthermore, 
• if the TCE/RWA ratio is 7% - 12%, the temporary and permanent expected benefits 
will range respectively between 1.102% - 1.714% and 23.136% - 35.997%; 
• if the NSFR is 1, the temporary and permanent expected benefits will be respectively 
0.699% and 14.670%. 
  
4.2 Economic Costs 
Even if there is uncertainty regarding the impacts on the economic growth due, on one side, to 
the degree of activism of the monetary policy18 and, on the other side, to the difficulty to 
convert the Reform into inputs, it is assumed that all the cost of meeting the NSFR is 
recovered by raising lending spreads and that the costs of debt are not affected. 
In general, a small increase in the capital ratio leads to an increase in the lending spread; 
higher lending rates reduce investments and output levels (decreasing income and/or raising 
																																																						




expenses), thereby reducing the long-run level of GDP. Banks can adopt several reactions to 
this reduction, such as the issue of new equity and the increase of retained earnings. 
The present study is based mainly on the impact of the new rules on interest rate spreads. As 
shown in Figure 10, the spreads remained very low during the timeframe of 1997-2007; 
however, a signal of the imminent financial instability was given by the fact that in 2007 the 
lending spreads were at a 10-year high. 
 
Another important factor taken into consideration is the welfare19; it considers additional 
important aspects (e.g., a small loss in steady-state output could reflect a large increase in 
hours worked, offset by a fall in consumption). 
Using the Van den Heuvel formula, the welfare-equivalent permanent loss in consumption 
caused by the regulatory tightening was calculated; it expresses the welfare cost of raising the 
















• D: total deposits; 
• C: aggregate consumption; 




• RE: risk-adjusted return on equity; 
• Rd: average interest rate on total deposits; 
• RL: net average return on total assets for the banking system; 
• L: total assets of the banking system. 
 
																																																						




To assess the impact of the Framework on the long-term steady-state level of output, I have 
mainly relied on some macroeconomic models – the Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium 
Models (DSGE) and the Vector Error-Correction Models (VECM). Two sets of policy 
scenarios have been considered, for capital and for liquidity, respectively; it was assumed that 
the capital tightening could be proxied by a 2, 4 or 6% increase in the TCE/RWA ratio. 
Regarding the liquidity, was considered a 25 or 50% increase: if banks increase liquid assets 
to reach a higher liquidity ratio, other things being equal, RWA decline and the TCE/RWA 
ratio increases. 
If the capital requirement increases, the steady state output is expected to decline: a 1% 













The higher liquidity requirements lead to an extra decline in the level of output (lines 4-9). 
This effect can be read as the difference between the “capital only” (lines 1-3) and the “capital 
and liquidity” scenarios (lines 4–9). Please refer to Figure 11 for all the detailed information. 
 
To summarize, the “results” of an increase in the capital and liquidity requirements are the 
welfare loss, in terms of consumption, a loss in the steady-state output and a decline in the 
output variability; tighter capital rules induce a decline in output volatility and the higher 
liquidity requirements lead to a reduction of the standard deviation of output20.  
5. Conclusions – The Net Benefit of Basel III 
	
Starting with an analysis of the milestones of Basel I and Basel II and a brief discussion about 
the recent Financial Crisis, this paper focuses its attention on Basel III and, in particular, on 
the long-term impact of the changes introduced. 
																																																						




The changes introduced by Basel III will be able to improve institutional settings (in 
regulation, supervision and governance) and, through prudential and macro-prudential 
regulations, to avoid migration to less regulated financial markets. Banks will be “obliged” to 
maintain a big portion of their credit exposures to governments21, which will have a 
privileged position in financial markets (with access to cheap credit). 
Higher capital and liquidity reduce the annual probability of banking crises, but the costs of 
the crisis have long-lasting effects on output. 
 
In the long-term, the economic benefits exceeds the economic costs; as higher capital 
requirements reduce the probability of a crisis and costs are not limited to a year, the more 
permanent the effects, the larger the annual benefit. 
In the short-term, the extent of the economic cost depends on the assumptions, the length of 
the implementation period and the country considered. 
Using the median estimate of the cost of a crisis, each 1% reduction in the annual probability 
of a crisis yields a benefit of 0.6% of GDP per year; because of the uncertainty, a 1% increase 
of the capital ratio cut the probability of crisis from 4.6% to 2.3% (with a benefit of 1.4% of 
GDP) and yields to a 0.13% increase in the lending spread (with a loss of 0.09% of GDP), 
with a positive net benefit in the long-term. 
In summary, I expect that Basel III will generate a significant positive net benefit for the 
economy, with a clear role for liquidity to prevent banking crises and economic downturns. 
The Reform, in fact, strengthening the quality of both banks’ capital bases and funding 
structures is likely to increase financial stability. 
  
																																																						

























































































































































Figure 9 - The relationships between TCE/RWA (or NSFR) and changes in the probability of a 
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